Kartellrecht-Literatur

Das Bundeskartellamt listet Neuerwerbungen – einschließlich kartellrechtlicher Zeitschriftenaufsätze – hier.

“Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog. A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network” veröffentlicht laufend e-Papers aus fremder Feder zu kartellrechtlichen Themen.

Trouvaillen:

… there was one more important lesson. If you are going to file a case as politically charged as AT&T, do it in the wake of a Watergate scandal and while the President is outside the country.

Particularly … the opaque nature of network management appear as matters which need to be addressed to achieve more effective network management.

Antitrust enforcers around the world, accustomed to hearing the American message of convergence, no doubt chuckled at the dissonance reverberating from the Section 2 Report. To those making their livelihood in antitrust, however, the controversy simply confirmed that the FTC marched to the beat of a different drummer when it came to enforcement against dominant firms.”

  • Frances Dethmers / Pier Posthuma de Boer, “Ten Years On: Vertical Agreements under Article 81″, [2009] E.C.L.R. 424 ff.

The main flaws of the Commission’s approach are the following.  First, the Commission is eager in its Guidelines to cover all possible angles and situations.  Instead of providing legal certainty, the Commission’s approach is often confusing … Secondly, despite its good intentions … the Commission’s stance on vertical agreements is still relatively negative … Because of these flaws, the policy does not accurately correspond with market reality.

… the Commission reacted negatively when Microsoft decided to unbundle IE from Windows 7-E. The ‘must carry’ remedy adopted fits more with an essential facilities case, where Windows would have been considered indispensable for the distribution of an Internet browser. We do not criticize the remedy as such, which could perhaps prove to be effective, in terms of reinvigorating competition in the Internet browser market, but the apparent mismatch between the consumer harm story and the remedy. It would be particularly damaging for the development of competition law and economic growth in general if plaintiffs could employ the less demanding, in terms of standard of proof, theory of consumer harm in order to achieve the most far reaching, in terms of commitments from a dominant firm, remedies.