Die überarbeiteten “Horizontal Merger Guidelines” des U.S. Department of Justice und der Federal Trade Commission wurden soeben veröffentlicht. Beim ersten Durchblättern sind sie in etwa das, womit gerechnet worden war: keine Revolution in Richtung pro-enforcement, sondern eine behutsame Anpassung an die aktuelle Verwaltungspraxis, mit einer handvoll möglicher Komplikationen. Zur Revision der Richtlinien im Blog hier und hier.
Aus der Pressenachricht von DOJ/FTC von heute:
The 2010 guidelines are different from the 1992 guidelines in several important ways. The guidelines:
* Clarify that merger analysis does not use a single methodology, but is a fact-specific process through which the agencies use a variety of tools to analyze the evidence to determine whether a merger may substantially lessen competition.
* Introduce a new section on “Evidence of Adverse Competitive Effects.” This section discusses several categories and sources of evidence that the agencies, in their experience, have found informative in predicting the likely competitive effects of mergers.
* Explain that market definition is not an end itself or a necessary starting point of merger analysis, and market concentration is a tool that is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger’s likely competitive effects.
* Provide an updated explanation of the hypothetical monopolist test used to define relevant antitrust markets and how the agencies implement that test in practice.
* Update the concentration thresholds that determine whether a transaction warrants further scrutiny by the agencies.
* Provide an expanded discussion of how the agencies evaluate unilateral competitive effects, including effects on innovation.
* Provide an updated section on coordinated effects. The guidelines clarify that coordinated effects, like unilateral effects, include conduct not otherwise condemned by the antitrust laws.
* Provide a simplified discussion of how the agencies evaluate whether entry into the relevant market is so easy that a merger is not likely to enhance market power.
* Add new sections on powerful buyers, mergers between competing buyers, and partial acquisitions.
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