Strafrechtliche Kartellverfolgung in den USA (2009):
- Insgesamt 25.396 Tage Haft (2000: 5.584 Tage)
- 80 % der Angeklagten werden verurteilt (2000: 38 %)
- durchschnittliche Haftdauer: 24 Monate (2000: 10 Monate)
In Bezug auf Haftstrafen für Ausländer ergänzt Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement:
The historic plea agreement the Antitrust Division entered into in May 1999 with a Swiss vitamin executive was the first that called for the imposition of jail time for a foreign national who had participated in an international cartel … When the Division began prosecuting international cartels, just convincing a foreign national to submit to U.S. jurisdiction and plead guilty was a major achievement. At that time, a no-jail deal was necessary for the Division to secure access to an important foreign witness or key foreign-located documents.
However, by 1999, the Antitrust Division’s ability to successfully investigate and prosecute foreign nationals who violate U.S. antitrust laws had significantly advanced, with enhanced investigative tools and increased international cooperation. Thus, “no-jail” deals became a relic of the past. Division practice now is to insist on jail sentences for all defendants domestic and foreign. The Division will not agree to a “no-jail” sentence for any defendant, and our practice is not to remain silent at sentencing if a defendant argues for a no-jail sentence.
Since May 1999, more than 40 foreign defendants have served, or are serving, prison sentences in the United States for participating in an international cartel or for obstructing an investigation of an international cartel. Foreign nationals from France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United Kingdom are among those defendants. The antitrust bar and business community understand that the Division is serious about its policy of insisting on jail sentences for both U.S. and foreign defendants. This realization provides further incentive for corporations to apply for leniency so that their cooperating executives will receive non-prosecution coverage. And if leniency is no longer available in an investigation, the Division’s insistence on jail terms encourages executives to come in early to cooperate to minimize their jail time and companies to come in early to minimize the number of individual carve outs who could be subject to jail sentences.
Quellen: Jahresbericht für das Geschäftsjahr 2009 des U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division; Scott D. Hammond, “The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades”, 25. Februar 2010.
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